

Message Text

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ACTION IO-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 AF-04 EUR-08 EA-06 PRS-01
PA-01 USIA-01 INR-05 NSC-05 NSCE-00 CIAE-00
DODE-00 SP-02 L-01 PM-03 /058 W
-----040212Z 064742 /72-62

R 032238Z JUN 77

FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3873
INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USLO PEKING
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USUN 1765

LIMDIS

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, CH, UN, US
SUBJECT: NEW PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CHINA CHEN
CHU CALLS ON AMBASSADOR YOUNG

REF: A. USUN 1612 (NOTAL); B. USUN 1581 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY: AMB CHEN CHU, CHINA'S NEW PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
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TO UN, PAID CORDIAL, INITIAL COURTESY CALL ON AMB YOUNG JUNE 2.
THE CONVERSATION FOCUSED ON AFRICAN ISSUES. CHEN CHU WAS
PARTICULARLY PLEASED WITH DEVELOPMENT IN ZAIRE. HE JUDGED
THESE TO HAVE FURTHER EXPOSED THE SOVIET CHARACTER TO THE
AFRICANS. HE STRESSED THAT SOVIET "MERCENARIES" HAD BEEN
EXPELLED FROM ZAIRE AND ZAIRE'S INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL
INTEGRITY HAD BEEN DEFENDED SUCCESSFULLY. SEVERAL TIMES,

CHEN CHU PUT STOCK IN VIOLENCE AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING POLITICAL ENDS. HE UNDERLINED, HOWEVER, CHOU EN LAI'S WORDS THAT CHINA WOULD NOT RESORT TO FORCE AGAINST THE US. CHEN CHU EMPHASIED THAT HE WAS CALLING ON YOUNG BUT NOT HIS SOVIET COUNTERPART IN NEW YORK. HE SAID HE HAD MUCH TO DISCUSS ON UN MATTERS WITH YOUNG AND YOUNG'S MISSION. CHEN CHU FORESAW THAT, WHILE THERE WOULD BE A "LOT OF DIFFERENCES" IN VIEWPOINT, THERE WOULD ALSO BE MANY "COMMON POINTS", SO THERE WOULD BE "BASIS" FOR DISCUSSION. IN RESPONSE, YOUNG, WHO EARLIER HAD EMPHASIZED TO CHEN CHU THE NEED FOR PARTIES TO TALK TO RESOLVE ISSUES, SAID "IF THERE ARE DIFFERENCES LET TALKS ABOUT THEM" END SUMMARY.

2. AFTER YOUNG HAD WELCOMED CHEN CHU, THE LATTER NOTED THAT YOUNG HAD JUST RETURNED FROM AFRICA. YOUNG REPLIED THAT THE AFRICANS HE HAD MET ON HIS TRIP HAD ALL HAD GOOD FEELINGS FOR CHEN CHU'S COUNTRY. CHEN CHU SAID YOUNG WAS THE YOUNGEST OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES HE HAD MET. YOUNG SAID HE MIGHT GET SOME GREY HAIRS, HOWEVER, NOT FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS BUT FROM OUR PRESS. CHEN CHU SAID THAT THE PRESS WAS ALWAYS ANXIOUS TO APPROACH YOUNG. YOUNG REPLIED THAT HE ALWAYS SPOKE THE TRUTH AND THEREFORE WAS NOT IN THE MOLD OF A PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMAT. CHEN CHU THOUGHT YOUNG HAD

DONE VERY WELL. YOUNG RECALLED THAT IN SAME OFFICE WHERE THEY WERE SITTING, MARTIN LUTHER KING AND HE HAD MET AMB GOLDBERG BACK IN 1965. AFTERWARDS, THEY HAD GONE DOWNSTAIRS AND THE PRESS HAD ASKED KING ABOUT THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. KING HAD SAID THAT
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800 MILLION PEOPLE WOULD NOT GO AWAY SIMPLY BECAUSE WE REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE THEM. KING HAD BEEN SHARPLY ATTACKED FOR SAYING THIS, BUT IT WAS A THING THAT HAD TO BE SAID. YOUNG CONSIDERED HIMSELF MORE IN KING TRADITION THAN IN DIPLOMATIC TRADITION. CHEN CHU NOTED MARTIN LUTHER KING'S ASSASSINATION. YOUNG REPLIED THAT THE ASSASSINATION HAD OCCURRED ABOUT FOUR YEARS LATER. CHEN CHU NOTED THAT WHILE MARTIN LUTHER KING WAS AGAINST VIOLENCE, HE WAS KILLED VIOLENTLY. YOUNG COMMENTED THAT MARTIN LUTHER KING WOULD HAVE BEEN KILLED EARLIER HAD HE ADVOCATED VIOLENCE. CHEN CHI NOTED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD APPLIED VIOLENT METHODS WITH SUCCESS IN ITS REVOLUTIONARY AND CIVIL WARS.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USUN 1765

LIMDIS

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

3. CHEN CHU ASKED IF YOUNG WOULD BE GOING TO THE ANTI-
APARTHEID CONFERENCE IN LAGOS THIS AUGUST. YOUNG BELIEVED
THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO GO.

4. CHEN CHU ASKED ABOUT RHODESIA. YOUNG SAID THE RHODESIANS
APPEARED TO BE PULLING OUT OF MOZAMBIQUE. YOUNG SAID THAT
IN SOME WAYS THE RHODESIAN STRIKE APPEARED TO BE RELATIVELY
MEANINGLESS, THAT THAT IT HAD NOT DESTROYED VERY MUCH.
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RHODESIA'S FORMER PRIME MINISTER GARFIELD TODD HAD VISITED
HIM JUNE 1. IN TODD'S VIEW, STRIKE WAS INTENDED TO BOLSTER
MORALE AMONG RHODESIA'S WHITES BECAUSE NATIONALISTS WERE
MOVING FREELY WITHIN RHODESIA AND SALISBURY WAS UNABLE
TO CONTAIN THEM. THEREFORE, STRIKE INTO MOZAMBIQUE WAS

MAINLY PROPAGANDA AFFAIR. YOUNG BELIEVED THAT UK-US EFFORTS WOULD CONTINUE ON RHODESIA, BUT HE DID NOT KNOW IF THESE WOULD BE FAST ENOUGH.

5. CHEN CHU ASKED IF THERE WOULD BE A UN SECURITY COUNCIL (UNSC) MEETING ON RHODESIAN STRIKE. YOUNG DOUBTED THAT THERE WOULD BE AND SAID THAT MOZAMBIQUE SEEMED RELUCTANT TO RAISE THIS ISSUE. A REASON BEING THAT TO BRING IT BEFORE UNSC MIGHT BE TO RELIEVE UK OF ITS FEELING OF RESPONSIBILITY IN AREA. YOUNG SAID AFRICANS WANTED TO KEEP BURDEN OF RESPONSIBILITY ON UK. YOUNG SAID UN SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM HAD TRIED TO REACH PRESIDENT MACHEL AND FOREIGN MINISTER CHISSANO OF MOZAMBIQUE AND HAD EVEN SOUGHT ASSISTANCE OF PRESIDENT NYERERE OF TANZANIA IN ATTEMPTING TO REACH THEM. HOWEVER, NEITHER MACHEL NOR CHISSANO HAD RESPONDED. YOUNG SUSPECTED THAT THEY WANTED TO AVOID BEING ON RECORD OF HAVING SAID "YES" OR "NO". CHEN CHU SPECULATED THAT MAYBE MOZAMBIQUE AND TANZANIA BELIEVED THAT UNSC CONSIDERATION WOULD BE OF NO UTILITY. CHEN CHU ADDED THAT, THEREFORE, THE RIGHT THING FOR THEM TO DO WOULD BE TO COUNTERATTACK.

6. CHEN CHU TURNED TO ZAIRE. HE NOTED THAT FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF THE FIGHTING AND ADDED THAT ONE COULD NOT HAVE EXPECTED SUCH RESULTS THROUGH UNSC ACTION. CHEN CHU SUSPECTED THAT YOUNG WAS HAPPY ABOUT ZAIRE. YOUNG REPLIED THAT HE WAS SORRY IT HAD OCCURRED. HE SAID THE PROBLEM WAS LARGELY AN INTER-NAL AFFAIR. FURTHERMORE, IT HAD MADE ZAIRE AND ANGOLA UNABLE TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES. ANGOLA THOUGHT THAT ZAIRE HAD BEEN SUPPORTING RAIDS INTO ANGOLA AND AS A RESULT HAD NOT

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RESTRAINED THE KATANGANS. ADDITIONALLY, THE ANGOLANS HAD PROBABLY EVEH HELPED THE KATANGANS. YOUNG RECALLED THAT, IN FEBRUARY, NIGERIA'S HEAD OF STATE HAD BEEN TRYING TO GET NETO AND MOBUTO TO TALK TOGETHER. WHEN MUBUTO LEARNED WHAT THE NIGERIANS WERE TRYING TO DO, HE HAD LEFT NIGERIA, PLEADING AN EMERGENCY IN ZAIRE. MOBUTO HAD TAKED WITH YOUNG AT LENGTH, BUT HE HAD NOT WANTED TO TALK TO NETO. YOUNG STRESSED THAT WHEN PEOPLE WILL NOT TALK TO EACH OTHER, THEY INEVITABLY FIGHT.

7. CHEN CHU SAID THAT CHINA WAS HAPPY ABOUT EVOLUTION OF EVENTS IN ZAIRE. HE WAS SURPRISED THAT YOUNG WAS UNHAPPY OVER ZAIRE. CHEN CHU STRESSED THAT, "FIRST AND FOREMOST, SOVIET MERCENARIES HAD BEEN EXPELLED AND THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF ZAIRE DEFENDED." FURTHERMORE, THE PRINCIPLE HAD BEEN SUSTAINED THAT IT IS IMPERMISSIBLE TO INVADE ANOTHER COUNTRY. CHEN CHU UNDERLINED THAT AFRICAN PEOPLES NOW HAD

SEEN THE SOVIET CHARTER AND FEATURES EVEN MORE CLEARLY. CHEN CHU UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SOVIET TONE AT MAPUTO HAD BEEN LOW. HE ASKED IF YOUNG DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS HAD TO DO WITH AFRICAN AWARENESS OF THE SOVIET DANGER.

8. YOUNG AGREED THAT THE OUTCOME IN ZAIRE HAD BEEN VERY GOOD, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE AFRICANS HAD DEFENDED TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. YOUNG CONTINUED THAT GENERALLY THE SOVIETS ARE SEEN AS MAKING MISCHIEF AND NOT DOING ANYTHING CONSTRUCTIVE. YOUNG SAID THE AFRICANS MORE AND MORE SEE AS THEIR FRIENDS THOSE WHO AID THEM WITH CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT. CHEN CHU REPLIED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD GIVEN "QUITE A NUMBER" OF ARMS TO AFRICAN STATES. HE THEN AGREED THAT IT WAS RIGHT FOR THE AFRICANS TO REGARD THOSE WHO "REALLY HELP THEM AS THEIR TRUE FRIENDS". CHEN CHU CONCLUDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE IN PARIS HAD NOT BEEN GOING TOO WELL.

9. CHEN CHU SAID THAT HE HAD MUCH TO DISCUSS REGARDING UN
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MATTERS WITH YOUNG AND HIS MISSION. CHEN CHU EXPECTED A "LOT OF DIFFERENCES" BUT ALSO "MANY COMMON POINTS", SO THERE WOULD BE "BASIS FOR DISCUSSION". YOUNG REPLIED "IF THERE ARE DIFFERENCES, LET'S TALK ABOUT THEM."

10. CHEN CHU, AFTER NEXT COMMENTING THAT CHINA FAVORED A POPULAR UPRISING IN SOUTH AFRICA, RECALLED THAT CHOU EN LAI HAD SAID CHINA HAD NO INTENTION TO FIGHT A WAR WITH THE US. CHINA WOULD NOT RESORT TO FORCE AGAINST THE US.

11. CHEN CHU SAID THAT, AS A NEWCOMER, HE WAS CALLING ON YOUNG. HE WAS NOT CALLING, HOWEVER, IN NEW YORK ON HIS "FORMER TOKYO COLLEAGUE" (SOVIET PERMREP TROYANOVSKY) WHO WAS "AN OLD FRIEND". THEREFORE, HE HAD CALLED ON A "NEW FRIEND", BUT NOT ON AN "OLD FRIEND". CHEN CHU MADE THE POINT THAT THIS WAS EXPLAINED BY THE "CHANGING SITUATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS."

12. BIOGRAPHIC NOTE: CHEN CHU SPOKE AND LISTENED THROUGH AN INTERPRETER, ALTHOUGH HE EVIDENTLY UNDERSTANDS A GOOD DEAL OF ENGLISH. AT USUN, HE WAS IMPRESSED BY A PAINTING, "MARBLE QUARRY AT CARRARA," BY JOHN SINGER SARGEANT AND BY A BRONZE, "THE BRONCO BUSTER", BY FREDERICK REMINTON. HE APPLAUDED THESE AND SAID HE MUCH PREFERRED "REALISM" IN ART.

YOUNG

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